Plaintiffs Plead Your Plus Factors: Supreme Court Steps Up Antitrust Conspiracy Pleading Requirements
Introduction
On May 21, 2007, the United States Supreme Court issued a significant 7-2 decision tightening the requirements for pleading antitrust conspiracies under Sherman Act § 1, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (No. 05-1126) 2007 U.S. LEXIS 5901. The Court held that to satisfy the pleading requirements of FRCP 8 and survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6), allegations of parallel conduct and bare assertions of conspiracy will not suffice. Id. at *23 ("Without more, parallel conduct does not suggest conspiracy, and a conclusory allegation of agreement at some unidentified point does not supply facts adequate to show illegality.") Thus, the Court found, when allegations of parallel conduct are set out as the basis of a Section 1 claim, "they must be placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as well be independent action." Id. at *24.
In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the longstanding formulation for deciding motions to dismiss set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 at 45-46 (1957) – "that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." See Twombly, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 5901 at *31-35. Now, under Twombly, a Section 1 plaintiff may not rely on the possibility that she might later establish some "some set of undisclosed facts to support recovery," but instead must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," and not merely "conceivable." Id. at *33, *47.
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