Antitrust Law Blog : Antitrust Lawyer & Attorney : Sheppard Mullin Law Firm : Antitrust Law Blog

In her first speech as Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, Christine Varney called for a return to vigorous antitrust enforcement and repudiated the Bush Administration's eight month old report on how the Antitrust Division would evaluate single firm conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, United States Department of Justice (2008) ("Report").

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The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has affirmed a grant of summary judgment for defendants in an antitrust action which, according to the court, mischaracterized a vertical course of conduct as a “horizontal conspiracy.” Nitro Distributing, Inc. v. Alticor, Inc., No. 08-1451, 2009 WL 1175504 (8th Cir. May 4, 2009). Applying the principles of Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984), and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574 (1986), the court held that it is incumbent upon an antitrust plaintiff, in attempting to allege a “genuine issue,” to exclude the possibility of independent action. This is so whether the alleged conduct is characterized as “direct evidence,” or “circumstantial evidence.” The court held that only by assuming its conclusion, and by mischaracterizing a vertical course of conduct as “horizontal,” could plaintiffs’ complaint state a claim.

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In 2004, California voters imposed limits on the state's famously broad Unfair Competition Law. More than four years later, the California Supreme Court has announced exactly where those limits lie.

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On May 13, the European Commission (EC) imposed a fine of €1.06 billion (approximately $1.45 billion) on Intel Corporation for allegedly violating EC Treaty antitrust rules on the abuse of a dominant market position (Article 82) by engaging in anticompetitive practices to exclude competitors from the market for computer chips called x86 central processing units (CPUs), which are considered to be "the main hardware of a computer." The EC also ordered Intel to cease the alleged illegal practices immediately to the extent that they were still ongoing.

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Carl Shapiro, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economics, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, provided a Statement, entitled "A New Age for Newspapers: Diversity of Voices, Competition and the Internet" (April 21, 2009), to the Subcommittee of Courts and Competition Policy, Committee of the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives. Mr. Shapiro, who served in that position once before, has been a Professor of Business and Economics at the Haas School of Business at the University of California at Berkeley since 1990.

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On April 24, 2009, a group of professors of law, economics and business, together with the American Antitrust Institute, the Public Patent Foundation, and AARP (collectively "amici") filed an amicus brief urging the Supreme Court to grant certiorari and reverse the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Cirpoflaxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("Cipro"). This is the latest advance in the heated debate over the legality of reverse payment settlements in the pharmaceutical industry, i.e., settlements of patent disputes in which the brand-name pharmaceutical company makes a "reverse" or "exclusion" payment to the would-be generic competitor to delay its entry into the relevant drug market. Such settlements have garnered significant attention and debate over the years because they implicate important policy considerations underlying antitrust and patent laws, as well the vital public interest in curbing soaring healthcare costs.

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Partner v. ExxonMobil Oil Corp., 08-1590 (6th Cir. May 4, 2009)

In 2000, plaintiff Partner & Partner, Inc. entered into a lease/franchise agreement with ExxonMobil to operate a Mobil-branded gasoline station. The lease was pursuant to an ExxonMobil Petroleum Marketing Practices Act (PMPA) franchise agreement, 15 USC Sections 2801-2806. The agreement expressly provided that it did not grant plaintiff an exclusive market or geographic area to sell branded gasoline, or to conduct related businesses. ExxonMobil expressly reserved the right to open or continue stations, franchises, or related businesses at locations of its choice.

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